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In a decentralized setting the game-theoretical predictions are that only strong 
blockings are allowed to rupture the structure of a matching. This paper argues that, 
under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these blockings 
come from the grand coalition. This solution concept requires stability plus Pareto 
optimality. A characterization of the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate 
and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational matchings whose 
blocking pairs, if any, are formed with unmatched agents.  These matchings always 
exist and give an economic intuition on how blocking can be done by non-trading 
agents, so that the transactions need not be undone as agents reach the set of stable 
matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and 
Roommate models are obtained. 
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  1INTRODUCTION, MAIN CONCEPTS AND RESULTS 
In a decentralized setting in which players can interact with each other and get 
together in groups, the game theoretic predictions are that a matching that can be upset 
by a coalition will not occur. When preferences are strict, the outcome of such 
coalitional interactions should then be a stable matching, if it exists. However, such 
predictions should be revised in the cases in which preferences are not necessarily strict. 
In such cases, it is justifiable that recontracts between pairs of agents already allocated 
according to a stable matching, leading to a weak Pareto improvement of the original 
matching, should be allowed. In this context, it makes sense to predict that only Pareto-
stable matchings, i.e. stable matchings that are Pareto optimal, will occur.  
This paper takes up this approach and proves some characteristic properties of 
the Pareto-stable matchings. It concentrates on the well-known Roommate and Marriage 
models, both introduced by Gale and Shapley in their famous paper of 1962. We follow 
the notations and concepts presented in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). The Roommate 
model is described as the pair  (N,P),  where  N={1,2,…,n}  is the set of players and  P 
is the set {P(1),…,P(n)},  where  P(j)  is an ordered list of preferences (strict or non-
strict) for player  j. The Marriage model is regarded as a sub-model of the Roommate 
model in which  N=M∪W,  M  is a set of men and  W  is a set of women. For the sake of 
exposition the main concepts will be introduced along this section, as well as the main 
results of this paper, which will be presented, motivated, discussed and illustrated with 
examples. We will not always provide a formal statement. The intuitive proofs will be 
provided here and the technical proofs will be presented in the next section.  
To figure out the kind of coalitional interaction taking place among agents 
allocated according to a stable matching that is not Pareto-optimal, see Example 1 
below.  
 
Example 1. (Pareto-stability is a natural solution concept for the roommate model) 
Consider a decentralized setting where a set of  eight  boys, 1,2,…,8, wish divide up 
into pairs of roommates. The boys’ preferences over acceptable partners are represented 
by the following ordered lists, where  P(j)  denotes boy  j’s  list for all  j=1,…,8: 
P(1)=8, 2, 1    P(5)=8, 6, 5 
P(2)=[3, 1], 2    P(6)=[3, 5], 6 
P(3)=2,6, 4, 3    P(7)=4, 8, 7 
P(4)=[3, 7], 4             P(8)= [1, 5, 7], 8 
  2The brackets in the preference lists of boys  2, 4, 6  and  8  mean that these 
agents are indifferent among the boys inside the brackets. The matching  z,  where  
z(1)=2, z(3)=4, z(5)=6, z(7)=8, doesn’t have any blocking pair, so it is stable. This 
means that no two boys can be both better off by becoming roommates. 
However, we cannot expect to observe this matching as the final outcome. In 
fact, boy  3 prefers boy  6  to his partner, boy 4; in his turn  boy  6  is indifferent 
between boy  3  and his partner, boy  5; boy 5  prefers  boy  8  to his partner, boy  6; boy  
8  is indifferent between boy  5 and  his partner, boy  7; on the other hand boy  7  
prefers boy  4  to his partner, boy  8  and boy  4  is indifferent between boy  7 and his 
partner boy  3. Thus, boys  3, 5 and 7  can act together and be better off  by exchanging 
their partners  6,  8  and  4 among them. It is natural to expect that this exchange will  be 
accepted by  6,  8  and  4,  since these boys are indifferent between their current partners 
under  z  and the new proposed mates. It is then reasonable to expect that these boys  
will form a new set of partnerships, {3,6}, {5,8} and  {7,4},  and that matching  w, such 
that  w(1)=2,  w(3)=6,  w(5)=8  and  w(7)=4,   will be the resulting matching of this 
coalitional interaction. Matching  w  is a weak Pareto improvement of matching  z  via 
coalition  {3,4,5,6,7,8}, which weakly blocks matching  z. Since a weak Pareto 
improvement of a matching does not create any blocking pair, and  z  is stable, then 
matching  w  is also stable.   
Considering that an exchange of partners is acceptable if it does not hurt 
anybody, it is then evident that an exchange of partners is acceptable only if (1) the 
agents involved are either all indifferent between their current partners and the new ones  
or they form a weak blocking coalition and (2) by matching the agents of the weak 
blocking coalition among them in an appropriate way, a weak Pareto improvement of 
the current matching is obtained.  
Having this in mind observe that once matching  w  is reached no more 
acceptable exchange of partners is possible. In fact, boys  7  and   5  are assigned to their 
first choice, so there is no acceptable exchange involving these boys and their partners. 
On the other hand, any exchange involving some of the remaining boys will necessarily 
involve boy  8,  partner of boy  5, who will not accept such pairwise interaction. Hence, 
although  z  and  w  are stable, only  w can be expected to occur.  
The pairs {3,2}  and  {1,8,} are the only weak blocking pairs of matching  w  but 
the coalition  {3,2,1,8} does not produce any weak Pareto-improvement of  w. Matching  
z  is also weakly blocked but only  w  is Pareto-stable.  
  3Observe that in this example coalition  {1,2,3,4,7,8} also weakly blocks 
matching  z,  and yields a weak Pareto-improvement given by the matching  w’, which 
assigns  1  to  8,  2  to  3,  4  to  7  and  5  to  6. This new matching is also Pareto-stable. 
No more acceptable exchange of partners will occur. g 
 
The Pareto-stability concept can be viewed as an intermediate concept between 
the stability concept and the strong-stability concept. In fact, the set of strongly stable 
matchings is contained in the set of Pareto-stable matchings, since if a stable matching 
is not Pareto-optimal then it has a weak Pareto-improvement via some weak-blocking 
coalition. When preferences are strict, these two sets coincide with the set of stable 
matchings, because there is no weak blocking coalitions. With indifferences, the 
previous example illustrates that the set of strongly stable matchings may be a proper 
subset of the set of Pareto-stable matchings, which may be a proper subset of the set of 
stable matchings. In that example the set of strongly stable matchings is empty.  
It is immediate that Pareto-stable matchings exist if and only if the set of stable 
matchings is non-empty. In fact, starting at any stable matching that is not Pareto 
optimal, a finite sequence of weak Pareto-improvements leads to a Pareto-stable 
matching. This is due to the fact that any weak Pareto improvement of a stable matching 
is still stable and the set of stable matchings is non-empty by assumption, it is finite and 
preferences are transitive. Consequently, a Pareto-stable matching always exists for the 
Marriage model.  
Assuming we have a stable matching, a natural question is how to test it for 
Pareto optimality.  Clearly, if  x  is a stable matching then matching  z  is  a weak Pareto 
improvement of  x  if: (i) the set  S={j∈N; z(j)≠x(j)}  is a weak blocking coalition of  x; 
(ii) x(S)=z(S)=S; (iii) if  j, k∈S  and  z(j)=k  then  (j,k)  is a weak blocking pair of  x  or 
both agents are indifferent between each other and their mates under  x  and  (iv) if  j∈S  
and  j  is unmatched under  z  then  j  must be indifferent between being unmatched and 
being matched to  x(j). Equivalently, given a stable matching  x,  we can say that  x  is 
Pareto optimal if none of the following requirements occurs: 
(1) There are sequences  (j1,j2,…,jq) and  (k1,k2,…,kq)  with  x(j1)=kq,  x(jt)=kt-1  
for all  t=2,…,q,  and such that either  (jt,kt)  is a weak blocking pair of  x  or  
both agents are indifferent between each other and their mates under  x,  for 
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t=1,…,q. 
(2) There are sequences  (j1,j2,…,jq) and  (k0,k1,…,kq)  where  kq  is unmatched 
under  x,  x(jt)=kt-1  for all  t=1,…,q,  k0  is indifferent between being 
unmatched at  x  and being matched to  j1=x(k0), and either  (jt,kt)  is a weak 
blocking pair of  x  or  both agents are indifferent between each other and 
their mates under  x,  for all  t=1,…,q.  Moreover,  (jt,kt)  is a weak blocking 
pair of  x  for some t=1,…,q. 
(3) There are sequences  (j1,j2,…,jq+1) and  (k1,…,kq)  where  j1  is unmatched 
under  x,  x(jt)=kt-1  for all  t=2,…,q+1,  jq+1  is indifferent between being 
unmatched at  x  and being matched to  kq=x(jq+1),  and either  (jt,kt)  is a 
weak blocking pair of  x  or  both agents are indifferent between each other 
and their mates under  x,  for all  t=1,…,q.  Moreover,  (jt,kt)  is a weak 
blocking pair of  x  for some t=1,…,q. 
In fact, if (1) occurs a weak Pareto improvement of  x  is obtained  by matching  
jt  to  kt, for all  t=1,…,q  and  keeping the other matches. If  (2) occurs then a weak 
Pareto improvement of  x  is obtained  by matching  jt  to  kt, for all  t=1,…,q, leaving  k0  
unmatched  and  keeping the other matches. If  (3) occurs then a weak Pareto 
improvement of  x  is obtained  by matching  jt  to  kt, for all  t=1,…,q, leaving  jq+1  
unmatched  and  keeping the other matches.    
The remaining part of this paper is devoted to finding the main properties that 
characterize the Pareto-stable matchings for the Roommate and Marriage models. Our 
main finding concerns the role played by the simple matchings and Pareto-simple 
matchings in the characterization of such outcomes
2. Simple matchings can be defined 
as follows: 
 
Definition 1. Matching  x  is simple if it is individually rational and all of its blocking 
pairs, if any, are formed with unmatched agents.  
 
Simple matchings exist even when stable matchings do not, since the matching 
where everyone is unmatched is simple. Clearly, every stable matching is simple. 
The concept of Pareto- simple matching is the following:  
                                                           
2 The idea of focusing on simple matchings has already been used in the literature for the proof of 
existence theorems in several matching models. (See the last section of this paper). 
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Definition 2. An individually rational matching  z  extends  the individually rational 
matching  x  if  z  is a weak Pareto improvement of  x. If  z  and  x  are simple we say 
that  z  is a simple extension of  x. A matching  x  is Pareto- simple if it is simple and 
does not have any simple extension.  
 
That is, matching  x  is Pareto- simple if it is simple and it is not weakly-
dominated by any other simple matching. Pareto-simple matchings always exist since 
the set of simple matchings is non-empty, finite and preferences are transitive.  
The following example, due to Gale and Shapley (1962), shows that the set of 
Pareto-simple matchings may be disjoint from the set of Pareto-optimal matchings, as 
well as from the set of Pareto-stable matchings.  
 
Example 2. (The set of Pareto-simple matchings, the set of Pareto-optimal matchings 
and the set of Pareto-stable matchings are disjoint) Consider the Roommate model 
where the set of boys is  N={1,2,3,4}. The boys’ preferences over acceptable partners 
are given by: 
P(1)=2,3,4,1    P(3)=1,2,4,3   
P(2)=3,1,4,2   P(4)=arbitrary   
  The set of Pareto-stable matchings is empty. There is no Pareto-simple matching 
that is Pareto-optimal. In fact, matching  x  where every agent is unmatched is the only 
simple matching because any other matching has a blocking pair where at least one boy 
is matched.   Then it is Pareto-simple. However, it is not Pareto-optimal since it is 
weakly dominated by, for example, matching  x
1,  which matches  1 to  2  and  3  to  4. 
Matching  x
1  is Pareto-optimal but it is not simple. The set of Pareto-optimal matchings 
also includes  x
2,  which matches  1 to  3  and  2  to  4  and  x
3  which matches  1 to  4  
and  3  to  2. g                          
  
The set of Pareto-stable matchings may be a non-empty proper subset of the set 
of Pareto-simple matchings and of the set of Pareto-optimal matchings, as illustrated in 
the example below.  
 
Example 3. (Pareto-stable matchings is a non-empty proper subset of the set of Pareto-
simple matchings and of the set of Pareto-optimal matchings.) Consider the Roommate 
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partners are given by: 
P(1)=2,3,1    P(4)=[5,6],4 
P(2)=3,1,2    P(5)=4,3,5 
P(3)=1,5,2,3                 P(6)=4,6 
The set of stable matchings is non-empty since matching  y,  such that  y(1)=2, 
y(3)=5  and  y(4)=6,  is stable. This is the only stable matching for this market. Since 
any Pareto-improvement of  y  must be stable then  y  is Pareto-optimal, so it is Pareto-
stable and Pareto-simple. The pair  {5,4}  weakly blocks  y, so the set of strongly stable 
matchings is empty.  Now, let  y’  be  the matching that assigns 5  to  4  and leaves 
unmatched the other boys. It is easy to see that  y’  is simple and unstable. On the other 
hand, there is no way to extend  y’  to a simple matching. In fact, boy  5  is matched to 
his first choice. Consequently, any weak-Pareto-improvement of  y’  will only involve 
the unmatched boys. However, any arrangement with these boys will have a blocking 
pair where at least one boy is matched. Then, any weak-Pareto-improvement of  y’ is 
not simple, so  y’  is a Pareto-simple matching. Since it is not stable then it is not Pareto-
stable.  Matching  y’  is not Pareto-optimal, since matching  z’  that assigns 5  to  4,  1  
to  2  and leaves unmatched the other agents, for example, is a weak-Pareto 
improvement of  y’. However, matching  z’  is not simple since the pair  {2,3}  blocks it  
and boy  2  is matched.  Then,  z’  is Pareto-optimal but it is not Pareto-stable.g 
                
As these examples suggest, the set of Pareto-stable matchings is the intersection 
of two non-empty Pareto sets: 
 
Theorem 1. The set of Pareto-stable matchings equals the intersection of the set of 
Pareto-simple matchings with the set of Pareto-optimal matchings. 
 
The proof of this result is straightforward. If a matching is Pareto-stable then it is 
simple and it is not weakly dominated by any individually rational matching, in 
particular it is not weakly dominated by any simple matching, so it is a Pareto-simple 
matching. Conversely, if  a matching is simple and Pareto-optimal then it must be 
stable, since otherwise it would have a blocking pair formed with unmatched agents and 
so, by matching these agents with each other, we would get a weak-Pareto-improvement 
of  the given matching, which would contradict its Pareto-optimality. 
  7  Thus, by Theorem 1, in order to show that Pareto-stable matchings exist it is 
sufficient to find just one Pareto-simple matching that is Pareto-optimal. It turns out that 
under strict preferences, if Pareto-stable matchings exist then every Pareto-simple 
matching must be Pareto-optimal, so every Pareto-simple matching must be stable. In 
fact, Theorem 2 provides a characterization of the set of Pareto-stable matchings as the 
set of Pareto-simple matchings. For the Roommate model it is required strictness of the 
preferences and non-emptiness of the set of stable matchings. For the Marriage model it 
is not imposed any restriction.  
 
Theorem 2. a) Consider the Roommate model with strict preferences and suppose the 
set of stable matchings  is non-empty. Then the set of Pareto-stable matchings equals 
the set of Pareto-simple  matchings.   
b) Consider the Marriage model. Then the set of Pareto-stable matchings equals the set 
of Pareto-simple  matchings.  
 
  The idea of the proof of this result is to show that every Pareto-simple matching 
is stable. If this is established then every Pareto-simple matching is Pareto optimal, 
since otherwise there would be a weak Pareto improvement of it, which would still be 
stable, so it would be simple, which is a contradiction. This is equivalent to show that 
every unstable and simple matching has a simple extension: 
 
Proposition 1. a)Consider the Roommate model with strict preferences. If the set of 
stable matchings is non-empty then every unstable and simple matching has a simple 
extension. 
b)Every  unstable and simple matching for the Marriage model has a simple extension. 
 
The proof of this proposition is given in the next section. Unlike the other results 
of this paper it is not straightforward. It is easy to obtain an extension  B  of an unstable 
and simple matching  A  for the Roommate model. It is enough to keep the partnerships 
formed under  A,  if any,  and to add some new partnerships. Of course, these new 
partnerships are formed with blocking pairs of  A.  What is not clear is that if the set of  
stable matchings is non-empty and preferences are strict, then  matching  B  can be 
constructed so that it is still simple. Without these requirements such construction of  B  
is not always possible. Indeed, to match the correct blocking pairs of  A  is the inventive 
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Example 3 are simple and unstable matchings but they cannot be extended to a simple 
matching. In the first case there is no stable matchings in the market and in the second 
case the preference of player 4 is not strict).  
The proof of Proposition 1-(a) uses a key lemma. This is a technical result, 
which is a one-sided version of the Decomposition lemma for the Marriage model from 
Gale and Sotomayor (1985). For part (b), the proof strongly uses the fact that the 
Marriage model has two sides. 
By Proposition 1, in order to conclude that the set of Pareto-stable matchings for 
the Roommate model with strict preferences is empty, it is enough to find just one 
Pareto-simple and unstable matching. See the example below. 
 
Example 4. (An application of Proposition 1-(a)) Consider the Roommate model where 
the set of boys is  N={1,2,…,7}. The boys’ preferences over acceptable partners are 
given by: 
P(1)=5, 6, 1      P(4)=6, 5, 4                          P(7)=2, 1, 3, 7 
P(2)=3, 7, 2      P(5)=4, 1, 6, 5 
P(3)=7, 2, 3                  P(6)=1, 4, 6 
The matching that assigns  4  to  5,  1  to  6  and leaves the other agents unmatched is 
simple and unstable. Any extension of this matching will match a pair of agents in  
{2,3,7}.  However, one of the agents in the pair will form a blocking pair with the agent 
left unmatched. Hence, the original matching does not have a simple extension. Since 
the preferences are strict, we need not check that every Pareto-simple matching is 
unstable. (Observe that the matching  that assigns 4  to  6,  1  to  5  and leaves the other 
agents unmatched is also Pareto-simple and unstable). Proposition 1 implies that the set 
of stable matchings is empty, so the set of Pareto-stable matchings is also empty. g 
 
  The following corollary is then immediate: 
 
Corollary 1. (a) Suppose the preferences in the Roommate model are strict. The set of 
stable matchings is non-empty if and only if every unstable and simple matching has a 
simple extension. 
(b) The set of stable matchings for the Marriage model is always non-empty. 
  
  9The fact that the condition in (a) is necessary is immediate from Proposition 1. It 
is sufficient since, if every  unstable and simple matching has a simple extension then 
the Pareto-simple matchings must be stable. The conclusion follows since Pareto-simple 
matchings always exist. The proof of part (b) is immediate from Proposition 1 b), since 
a Pareto-simple matching always exists and cannot have a simple extension. 
It is easy to construct examples for the Marriage model where, as in the 
Roommate model, the set of strongly stable matchings is empty.  However, it is well 
known that the existence of two sides in the Marriage market causes fundamental 
differences between the two models. There are properties of the Marriage model which 
depend on the two-sidedness of the market, as the non-emptiness of the set of stable 
matchings under any kind of preferences and the lattice property of the set of stable 
matchings when preferences are strict. This last property guarantees the existence of the 
optimal stable matchings for each side of the market. Moreover, it implies that if the 
two optimal stable matchings coincide then the set of stable matchings is a singleton. 
When preferences need not be strict, the lattice property may fail to hold even when the 
man-optimal and the woman-optimal stable matchings exist.  Moreover, the man-
optimal stable matching may coincide with the woman-optimal stable matching when 
the set of stable matchings is not a singleton. See the example below. 
 
Example 5. (The woman-optimal and the man-optimal stable matchings coincide but 
the set of stable matchings is not a singleton) Consider the Marriage model where the 
set of agents are  M={m1, m2}  and  W={w1,w2}. Agent  m1  is indifferent between  w1  
and  w2; m2  prefers  w1  to  w2; w1  is indifferent between  m1  and  m2  and  w2  prefers  
m1  to  m2. Both matchings under which no agent is unmatched are stable and are the 
only stable matchings. The matching  y
1  where  y
1(m1)=w1  and  y
1(m2)=w2  is not 
Pareto-optimal and is not strongly stable. It is weakly Pareto improved by matching  y
2  
where  y
2(m1)=w2  and  y
2(m2)=w1. Matching  y
2  is strongly stable. Matching  y
2  is 
clearly optimal for the men and for the women but matching  y
1  is also stable. g 
 
The key lemma mentioned above is also used in this paper to extend, to the 
Roommate model with strict preferences, two well-known properties for the Marriage 
model with strict preferences. The first result reflects an opposition of interests between 
the two players involved in a partnership regarding two Pareto-stable matchings. It 
asserts that if  x  and  y  are Pareto-stable matchings and  j  prefers  x  to  y  then j is 
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implies that the set of trading agents at a simple matching can be regarded as a sort of 
stable coalition in the sense that such agents always make their transactions under a 
stable matching within the same pool. In particular, the set of matched agents under a 
Pareto-stable matching is the same under any Pareto-stable matching. The proof of both 
results will be given in the next section. 
 The present work also addresses the case of non-necessarily strict preferences. 
Similar results to those stated under the assumption of strict preferences, by focusing on 
strongly stable matchings and strongly simple matchings, are obtained and presented in 
section 3. The proofs of these results follow the lines of the proofs of the corresponding 
results under strict preferences and are left to the reader. Some final conclusions and 
related work are presented in the last section. 
 
2.  TECHNICAL PROOFS 
The following result is a technical lemma that will be used to prove some of our 
results. The idea is the following. Given a pair of matchings, one stable and the other 
simple, non-necessarily stable, the set of agents who prefer one matching to the other 
can be decomposed into two disjoint sets, such that the agents from one set are matched 
to the agents of the other set under both matchings. A special case of this result, in 
which both matchings are stable, was obtained in Gale and Sotomayor (1985) for the 
Marriage model and called by these authors Decomposition lemma.  
  
Lemma 1. Suppose the preferences are strict. Consider the Roommate model  (N,P). 
Let  x  be a simple matching and let  y  be a stable matching. Let   T={j∈N; x(j)≠j},  
Mx={j∈N; x(j) >j y(j)}  and  My={j∈T; y(j) >j x(j)}.  Then  x(Mx)= y(Mx)=My  and  
x(My)=y(My)=Mx. 
Proof. First observe that all  j  in  Mx  are matched under  x  and all  j  in  My  are 
matched under  y.  If  j  is in  Mx  then  x(j)≠y(j)  and  k=x(j)  is in  My,  for otherwise the 
strictness of the preferences will imply that  j=x(k) >k y(k), so  y  will be blocked by  j  
and  k,  which contradicts the assumption that  y  is stable.  On the other hand, if  k  is in  
My  then  y(k)≠x(k)  and  j=y(k)  is in  Mx,  for if not the strictness of the preferences will 
imply that   k=y(j) >j x(j),  so  x  will be blocked by  j  and  k. However,  k  is  in  T,  so  
k  is matched under  x,  which contradicts the fact that  x  is simple. Therefore,   
  11x(Mx)⊆My  and  y(My)⊆Mx. Since   x  and  y  are one-to-one and  Mx  and  My  are finite 
sets, the conclusion follows.  Hence the proof is complete.g 
 
Proposition 1. (a) Consider  the Roommate model  (N,P).  Let  x  be an unstable and 
simple matching. If the set of stable matchings is non-empty then   x  can be extended to 
a simple matching. 
 (b) Consider the Marriage model  (M,W,P). Let  x  be an unstable and simple matching. 
Then  x  can be extended to a simple matching. 
Proof of part (a).  Let  y  be a stable matching. Using the notation of Lemma 1, set  S≡ 
Mx∪My. To prove that  x  has a simple extension define matching  z  to agree with  x  on  
S  and with  y  on  N-S. Lemma 1 implies that all of  S  are matched among them under  
x  and  y,  so z  is well defined. Clearly,  z  is individually rational and restricted to  S  
(because  x  is simple) or  N-S  (because  y  is stable) is stable. Then, if there is a 
blocking pair  {j,k}  we must have that  j∈N-S  and  k∈S. Then  j>k z(k)=x(k)  and  k>j 
z(j)=y(j)≥j x(j), so   {j,k}  blocks  x.  However,  k  is matched at  x,  which contradicts the 
fact that  x  is simple. Hence,  z  is stable.  It is also clear that  z  extends  x.  In fact, we 
have that  z(j)=x(j)  for every  j∈S  and  z(j)=y(j)≥jx(j)  for every  j∉S.  Furthermore,  
x≠z due to the fact that  x  is unstable and  z  is stable. Hence,  z(j)≥jx(j)  for every j,  
with strict preference for at least one  j∈N.  Then,  z  extends  x  and we have proved 
part (a). 
Proof of part (b). The fact that  x  is simple and unstable implies that every blocking 
pair is formed with unmatched agents. Choose  (m1,w1)  such that  w1  is one of m1’s 
favorite blocking partners (m1  may have more than one favorite blocking partner since 
preferences need not be strict). Now let  x1  be the matching that matches  m1  with  w1 
and agrees with  x  on every other agent. Clearly, every woman weakly prefers  x1  to  x  
and  w1  strictly prefers  x1  to  x. Also every man weakly prefers  x1  to  x. Therefore  x1  
is a weak Pareto-improvement of  x. If  x1  is unstable then choose  (m2,w2)  such that  
w2  is one of the  m2’s favorite blocking partners. (Note that  w2  might be  w1).  Of 
course,  (m2,w2)  also blocks  x  and since  x  is simple we must have that  m2  and  w2  
are unmatched under  x.  By construction of  x1  we  have that  m2  is also unmatched at 
x1.  Now let  x2  be the matching that matches  m2  to  w2, leaves  m1  unmatched in case  
w2=w1, and otherwise agrees with  x1  on every other agent.  Clearly, all women weakly 
prefer  x2  to  x1,  and by transitivity they prefer  x2  to  x;  w2  strictly prefers  x2  to  x1,  
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Pareto-improvement of  x.  Again, if  x2  is unstable then choose  (m3,w3)  such that  w3  
is one of the  m3’s favorite blocking partners. (Note that  w3  might be  w1  or  w2). Of 
course,  (m3,w3)  also blocks  x  and since  x  is simple we must have that  m3  and  w3  
are unmatched under  x.  By construction of  x2  we  have that  m3  is also unmatched at 
x2.  Then, let  x3  be the matching that matches  m3  with  w3,  leaves  mj  unmatched in 
case  w3=wj  for some  j∈{1,2},  and otherwise agrees with  x2  on every other agent, and 
so on.  Following this procedure, we can construct a sequence of matchings, x1, x2, 
x3,…, where every term of the sequence is a weak Pareto-improvement of  x,  it is 
weakly preferred by every woman and it is strictly preferred by at least one woman to 
the previous terms, so the matchings of this sequence are distinct. Since the number of 
matchings is finite we must have that this sequence ends with a matching  x* which is a 
weak Pareto-improvement of  x  and does not have any blocking pair.   Hence  x*  is 
stable (so it is simple) and extends  x, so the proof is complete. g 
 
Remark 1. In the proof of Proposition 1-b), matchings x1, x2, x3,…, are not necessarily 
simple. They belong to a special class of matchings, which we call here semi-simple 
matchings. They are the individually rational matchings such that all of its blocking 
pairs, if any, have a single man
3. Therefore, every simple matching and every stable 
matching are semi-simple. We learned from the proof of Proposition 1-b) that we can 
construct a sequence of distinct semi-simple matchings, starting at any semi-simple 
matching, by satisfying some blocking pairs conveniently chosen, leading to a stable 
matching. Unlike the algorithm of Gale and Shapley, this final matching is not 
necessarily an extreme point of the lattice of the stable matchings.g 
 
The following two properties of the Pareto-stable matchings, already discussed 
in the previous section, can also be derived from Lemma 1 under the assumption of 
strict preferences.  
 
Property 1. Suppose the preferences are strict. Let  x  and y  be  Pareto-stable 
matchings. If  j  prefers  x  to  y  then  k=x(j)≠j,  for some  k,  and  h=y(j)≠j,   for some  h  
with  h≠k. Furthermore, both  k  and  h   prefer  y  to x. 
                                                           
3 This concept was first used in the literature in Sotomayor (1996).  
  13Proof. Using the notation of Lemma 1, if  x(j)>jy(j)  then  j∈Mx.  It follows from this 
lemma that  j  is matched under  x  and under  y  and both mates belong to  My. g 
 
Property 2. Suppose the preferences are strict. Let  x  be a simple matching and let  y  
be a stable matching. If j∈N  is unmatched under y  then  j  is unmatched under  x. 
Proof. Using the notation of Lemma 1, if  j  was unmatched under  y,  but he was 
matched under  x,  then  he would belong to  Mx,  so he would be matched under  y  by  
Lemma 1, contradiction. g 
 
The following corollary is immediate: 
 
Corollary 2.  Suppose the preferences are strict. Then the set of unmatched agents 
under a Pareto-stable matching is the same for every Pareto-stable matching.  
 
3. WHEN PREFERENCES NEED NOT BE STRICT 
If we relax the assumption of strictness of the preferences, we can obtain  similar 
results to those presented in the previous section by focusing on strongly stable 
matchings and strongly simple matchings. The proofs of these results are trivial 
adaptations of the proofs presented in section 2 and will be left to the reader. 
 
Definition 3. The matching  x  is  strongly simple if it is individually rational and no 
matched agent is part of a weak blocking pair. Matching  x  is called Pareto-strongly 
simple if it is strongly simple and it is not weakly dominated by any strongly  simple 
matching.  
 
   Clearly, the matching where every agent is unmatched is strongly simple. Also, 
if a matching is strongly stable then it is strongly simple. From the definition above, if a 
matching is Pareto-simple and strongly simple then it is Pareto-strongly simple. If a 
matching   is strongly stable then it is Pareto-optimal and strongly simple, so it is 
Pareto-strongly simple. A sort of converse is given by Proposition 2 that asserts that 
under the assumption that the set of strongly stable matchings is non-empty, we have 
that every Pareto-strongly simple matching is strongly stable. Properties 3 and 4 are the 
corresponding extensions of Properties 1 and 2 to the case in which preferences are non-
  14necessarily strict. The proofs of these three results use the straightforward extension of 
Lemma 1 where stable and simple are replaced by strongly stable and strongly simple, 
respectively, with the adequate adaptations.  
 
Proposition 2. Suppose the set of strongly stable matchings is non-empty. Then, the set 
of Pareto-strongly simple matchings equals the set of strongly stable matchings.  
   
Property 3.  Let  x  and y  be strongly stable matchings for the Roommate model  (N,P). 
If  j  prefers  x  to  y  then  k=x(j)≠j,  for some  k,  and  h=y(j)≠j,   for some  h≠k. 
Furthermore, both  k  and  h   prefer  y  to x. 
 
The following corollary asserts that there is an opposition of interests between 
the two sides of the Marriage market along the whole set of strongly-stable matchings.
4
 
Corollary 3. Consider the Marriage market  (M,W,P).  Let  x  and  y  be strongly stable 
matchings. Then, all men like  x  at least as well as  y  if and only if all women like  y  at 
least as well as  x.   
Proof. Suppose  all men like  x  at least as well as  y.  If there is some woman  w  such 
that  x(w)>wy(w)  then  x(w)=m  for some  m∈M  and  m  prefers  y  to  x  by Property 1,  
contradiction. Hence, no woman prefers  x  to  y  and so  all women like  y  at least as 
well as  x.  The other direction is proved similarly.g 
 
Given two strongly stable matchings,  x  and  y,  the trading agents at  x, who are 
not indifferent between the two outcomes, trade among themselves at y. Consequently, 
an unmatched agent under  y  either is also unmatched under  x  or is indifferent between 
his/her mate under  x  and being unmatched.  Formally, 
  
Property 4.  Let  x  and  y  be strongly stable matchings. If  j  is unmatched under  y  
then  j is indifferent between  x(j) and being unmatched.
 5
 
                                                           
4 Knuth (1976) proved this result for the case where preferences are strict.  
5 This result was proved for the Marriage market and for the College admission market with strict preferences by 
Gale and Sotomayor (1985a,b). A different proof is provided by McVitie and Wilson (1970) for the particular 
Marriage market where all men and women are mutually acceptable.  For the College admission model, Roth (1986) 
proved that if a college does not fill its quota under some stable matching then it is matched to the same set of 
students under every stable matching. 
  154. CONCLUSION AND RELATED WORK. 
  Basically, we can identify four sets, each a superset of the next: The weak Pareto 
frontier, the set of stable matchings, the set of Pareto-stable matchings and the set of 
strongly stable matchings. The set of stable matchings is always a subset of the set of 
weak Pareto-optimal matchings, understood as those allocations for which the grand 
coalition cannot strongly block, i.e., the grand coalition does not cause a strict Pareto 
improvement. We proved that when preferences are strict the three last sets coincide. 
With indifferences, Pareto-stability plays the role of an intermediate solution concept: 
the set of Pareto-stable matchings may be a proper subset of the set of stable matchings 
and may properly contain the set of strongly stable matchings. It is non-empty when the 
set of stable matchings is non-empty.  
Of course we may have Pareto-optimal matchings that are unstable. However, if 
a Pareto-optimal  matching is simple then it is stable. In fact, we characterized the set of 
Pareto-stable matchings as the intersection of two non-empty sets: the set of Pareto-
simple matchings and the set of Pareto-optimal matchings. For the Marriage model, 
without imposing any restriction, and for the Roommate model, under the assumption of 
strict preferences and non-emptiness of the set of stable matchings, the Pareto-stable 
matchings are exactly the Pareto-simple matchings. With indifferences, Example 3 
showed that there may be Pareto-simple matchings for the Roommate model that are not 
Pareto-stable.  
From the conceptual point of view, it is natural that in a decentralized setting, 
recontracts between pairs of agents already allocated according to a stable matching 
leading to a weak Pareto improvement of the original matching should be expected.  
From the technical point of view, the characterization of Pareto-stable matchings 
in terms of Pareto-simple matchings provides us more understanding of the role of 
unmatched versus matched agents. Simple matchings capture a sort of dynamic flavor to 
coalition formation, without an explicit model of dynamics. For the Roommate model 
under strict preferences, starting from an unstable and simple matching (for example, 
the matching where every player is unmatched, if it is unstable), it is possible to 
gradually increase cooperation by making weak-Pareto improvements and still staying 
within the set of simple matchings, until no pairwise transaction is able to benefit all 
agents involved, or until the matching cannot be simple anymore. In the former case a 
stable matching has been reached. In the latter case, the set of stable matchings is 
empty, so increase in payoffs is only available through non-optimal (in the selfish 
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sequence of simple matchings that keep the current trades and add new ones, leading to 
a Pareto-simple matching. Thus, once a transaction is done, it will not be undone at the 
subsequent matching. Only agents who are not currently trading are able, by trading 
among them, to be better off. 
This dynamics can be identified, for example, in the steps of the Top Trading 
Cycles algorithm due to Gale, for the Housing market of Shapley and Scarf (1974). 
Each cycle formed by the Top Trading Cycles algorithm produces a simple allocation, 
defined in the straightforward manner for the Housing model (see Sotomayor, 2005). In 
each step one more cycle is added. The sequence of such simple allocations converges 
to a core outcome as soon as no more cycles can be added.  
For the Marriage model with non-necessarily strict preferences, starting with any 
simple matching (for example, the simple and semi-simple matching in which every 
agent is unmatched), we can construct a sequence of weak Pareto-improvements of the 
original matching and still stay within the set of semi-simple matchings. Each term of 
the sequence is obtained by matching some blocking pair where the man is currently 
unmatched and the woman is one of his favorite blocking partners. In this sequence of 
pairwise interactions the women currently matched stay matched (not necessarily to the 
same mate). Furthermore, the trades can be done without hurting any woman. This 
sequence of distinct and semi-simple matchings clearly ends with a matching that does 
not have any blocking pair, so the final matching is stable. This is the general basis 
which underlies the construction of the algorithm of Gale and Shapley with the men 
proposing. The matching produced in each step of this algorithm is semi-simple and it is 
a weak Pareto-improvement of the simple matching in which every agent is unmatched. 
However our approach  is different since: (i) we do not require to break ties when 
preferences are not strict; (ii) the initial point of our sequence need not be the matching 
where everyone is unmatched, so (iii) the final matching is not necessarily the man-
optimal stable matching.  
  This justifies Pareto-stability.  
Stability and Pareto optimality only for the students were required in Erdil and 
Ergin (2007) to replace the standard concept of student optimal stable matching for the 
school choice model. That is, according to this concept, a stable matching is called a 
“student optimal stable matching” if no stable matching is weakly preferred by all 
students to that matching. These authors present a simple procedure to compute a 
  17“student optimal stable matching”, under the assumption that priorities are weak and the 
preferences of the students are strict. In this model, since preferences of schools are not 
considered, the exchange of partners does not always produce a weak Pareto 
improvement of the given matching and it does not always yield a stable matching. 
Then, in order to compute a stable and Pareto optimal matching for the students, the 
authors considered exchange of partners only inside a stable improvement cycle, defined 
as a cycle of students who each prefer the school to which the next student in the cycle 
is matched, and each of whom is one of the school's most preferred candidates among 
the students who prefer that school to their current match. Therefore, a stable 
improvement cycle produces a stable matching in which some schools may be worse off 
and the students of the cycle are strictly better off. Starting with a student-proposing 
deferred acceptance algorithm with arbitrary tie-breaking of non-strict preferences by 
schools, the authors construct a computationally efficient algorithm which, in each step, 
improves the current matching for the students, by finding and satisfying stable 
improvement cycles, until no more remain. The outcome of such an algorithm is then a 
stable matching that is Pareto optimal with respect to students.  
The idea of proving the non-emptiness of the core by showing that every Pareto-
simple outcome must be stable has been explored in the literature via adaptations of the 
concept formulated here of simple matching. In Sotomayor (2005), for example, it was 
introduced the concept of simple allocation for the one-sided market (not matching 
market) of Shapley and Scarf (1974). There, it was proved that every Pareto-simple 
allocation must be in the core.  
For the two-sided matching models it has been more convenient to work with the 
concept of semi-simple outcome, whose discrete version was introduced in Sotomayor 
(1996) for the Marriage market. The extension of this concept to a general discrete 
many-to-many matching market (in particular, to the College Admission model), where  
preferences are substitutable and non-necessarily strict, was introduced in Sotomayor 
(1999) to prove the non-emptiness of the set of pairwise-stable matchings. A similar 
idea was used in Sotomayor (2004) to show the existence of Nash equilibria in an 
implementation mechanism for the discrete many-to-many matching model.  The 
continuous version of that concept was used in Sotomayor (2000) for the Assignment 
game of Shapley and Shubik (1972) and for a unified two-sided matching model.  
The possibility of obtaining a stable matching for the discrete matching models, 
by starting from an arbitrary unstable matching and successively satisfying blocking 
  18pairs, has been the subject of several papers, motivated by an open problem posed by 
Knuth (1976): Let  μ  be  an unstable matching for the Marriage model (M,W,P) with 
strict preferences. Is there a sequence of matchings  μ=μ1, …,μk,  such that  μk  is stable 
and for each  i=1,…,k-1,  there is a blocking pair  (mi,wi)∈MxW  for  μi,  such that the 
subsequent matching  μi+1 matches  mi  to  wi, μi(mi)  to  μi(wi) in case  mi  and  wi  are 
matched under μi, in case only one of these agents is matched then the corresponding 
mate is left unmatched, and the other matches at  μi  are kept unchanged?   
Knuth illustrates with an example that if the sequence of unstable matchings is 
not conveniently formed then it may cycle. Unlike the unstable simple matchings, the 
members of the selected blocking pairs of these unstable matchings need not be 
unmatched.  In case they are matched, it is a crucial point in Knuth’s problem that their 
current mates must be matched to each other in the subsequent matching. Thus, it is not 
correct the assertion that has been made in the literature that Roth and Vande Vate 
(1990) answered Knuth’s question in the affirmative. In the approach treated by Roth et 
al., if the blocking pair  (mi,wi)  is selected then  μi(mi) and  μi(wi)  are left unmatched. 
This case is easily solved by using a version of the deferred-acceptance algorithm of 
Gale and Shapley.  
According to our results, Knuth’s problem is solved for the Marriage model 
when μ  is unstable and semi-simple. It is also solved for the Roommate model with 
strict preferences when μ  is unstable and simple. Under indifferences this problem may 
have no solution for the Roommate problem, even when the set of stable matchings is 
non-empty. In fact, in our Example 3, matching  y  is the only stable matching and 
matching  y’ is unstable. If we start with  y’,  the procedure proposed by Knuth never 
reaches  y;  it always cycles.  
Although the result of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) does not solve Knuth’s 
problem, an immediate corollary of it is that a random process that begins from an 
arbitrary matching and continues by satisfying a randomly selected blocking pair must 
eventually converge with probability one to a stable matching, provided each blocking 
pair has a probability of being selected that is bounded away from zero. This corollary 
has given origin to several other papers.  Chung (2000), for example, proves that this 
random-paths-to-stability result applies to the Roommate model under the assumption 
of non-necessarily strict preferences, as long as some sufficient condition for the 
existence of stable matchings, called no-odd-rings, is satisfied. If the no-odd-ring 
  19condition is not satisfied but preferences are strict and stable matchings exist then the 
Roth and Vande Vate path still converges to a stable matching (Diamantoudi et al. 
2004).  
Inarra, Larrea and Molis (2008) generalizes  for the Roommate model the result 
of Diamantoudi et al. (2004), and consequently that of Chung (2000) under strict 
preferences and the one of Roth and Vande Vate (1990). They prove that from any 
matching for the Roommate model with strict preferences, there exists a path, given by 
a proposal-rejection procedure, which reaches a specific matching
6 that has the property 
to be stable when the set of stable matchings is non-empty. 
Kojima and Unver (2006) study the convergence to stability in many-to-many 
matching models. Klaus and Klijn (2007) analyze this convergence for matching 
markets with couples. 
The presence of indifference in the preferences of the agents in the discrete 
matching models, affecting the existence of strongly stable matchings, has  been 
considered by several authors. Irving (1994), for example, formulated an O(n
4) 
algorithm for determining whether a given instance of the Marriage model, with  n  men 
and  n  women  and complete lists of non-necessarily strict preferences, admits a 
strongly stable matching and for constructing one if it does. An extension of this 
algorithm by allowing incomplete lists of preferences is presented in Manlove (1999). 
Irving, Manlove and Scott (2000) present an algorithm to determine whether a given 
instance of the Hospitals/Residents Problem with indifferences admits a super-stable 
matching and, if it does, to construct such a matching. They define a super-stable 
matching  x  as a stable matching for which there is no pair, resident/hospital, not 
matched to each other, such that (a) the resident is indifferent between his partner and 
the hospital and (b) the hospital is indifferent between its worst partner and the resident. 
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